- Character-level truth(describes what analyticity depends on)
- Something that remains true no matter what situation or context you're talking about—the opposite of statements that change meaning depending on when or where they're said.
- Expression-types(what analytics is described as a fact about)
- The general category or form of a phrase or sentence, as opposed to any single instance of it being spoken—like the sentence-type 'hello' versus every individual time someone says it.
- Metalinguistic fact(describes what kind of fact analyticity is)
- A true statement about language itself, rather than about the world—like facts about grammar or what words mean.
- Modal fact(contrasted with metalinguistic facts)
- A fact about what is possible, impossible, necessary, or contingent (could be otherwise)—rather than just what happens to be true.
- Necessity-analyticity gap(the main concept being debated in the statement)
- A potential difference between truths that are necessary (must be true about reality) and truths that are analytic (true just by definition)—whether these are actually different things.
- analyticity(Quine regards this as a problematical concept)
- The property of a sentence being true by virtue of meaning alone
- context of utterance(The temporal operator 'one hundred years ago' is said to shift this context for expressions in its scope)
- The contextual parameters (including time) relative to which the reference of context-sensitive expressions is determined
- metaphysical necessity(Distinguishing types of necessity)
- A property of things that must be the case but not purely by logical form — true in all possible worlds without being logical tautologies
- propositions(Answer to the question of what metaphysical category propositions belong to)
- Entities belonging to a sui generis metaphysical category of their own kind, not reducible to other categories