If believing were a relation to physical tokens, type-identical beliefs across languages would be impossible, contradicting the evident fact of cross-linguistic propositional agreement (Frege, 'The Thought', 1918).

?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

Cross-linguistic propositional agreement(as the real-world fact the argument appeals to): The fact that two people speaking different languages can hold the exact same belief or agree on the same truth—for example, an English speaker and a French speaker both believing 'snow is white.'
Frege, Gottlob(namesake of the distinction being discussed): A German philosopher and mathematician (1848–1925) who developed foundational ideas about how language and meaning work, particularly about the difference between what a word refers to and what it means.
Physical tokens(as what mental events are supposedly identical to): Specific, individual instances of brain activity or neural events—the actual biological occurrences happening in your brain right now, as opposed to types or categories.
Relation to physical tokens(as the theory being tested in this argument): A theory suggesting that beliefs are fundamentally connected to or defined by physical objects (like neural patterns or written symbols) rather than abstract meanings.

Based on where you are in your exploration