If compatibilist freedom suffices for genuine moral responsibility and authentic virtue, the purported axiological superiority of libertarian free will—and thus God's reason to prefer it—is unestablished.
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(Used to frame the tension between divine freedom and divine moral goodness.)
An account of free will according to which being free with respect to an action requires the possibility of acting otherwise.
moral responsibility(The author argues for a pluralistic understanding rather than a Kantian-exclusive one)
A normative concept whose scope is contested; the passage implies it encompasses at least Kantian notions (centered on individual rational agency) and other notions (potentially sociological, collective, or non-individualist in character)