If creaturely happiness were genuinely ultimate for God, God's will would be partly constituted by contingent beings, compromising divine aseity as defended by Aquinas in Summa Theologiae I.19.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
Summa Theologiae I.19(as a citation to a specific philosophical argument)
A specific section (Part 1, Question 19) of Aquinas's Summa Theologiae where he discusses God's will and how it relates to God's independence and perfection.
Ultimate(as used in metaphysics)
Fundamental or most basic; the deepest level of explanation or reality.
contingent beings(Modal metaphysics)
Beings whose existence is not necessary — they exist but could have failed to exist
creaturely happiness(as used in theology and metaphysics)
The well-being or flourishing of created beings (things that were made or brought into existence), as opposed to God's own happiness.
will(Herbart's practical philosophy; distinguished from mere desire by cognitive determinacy and belief in attainability)
A species of desire marked by determinate cognition and fixing of its object, combined with conviction that the object is attainable