If determinate incompatibility is already a conceptual datum about determinable-determinate structure, Armstrong's partial identity account is explanatorily idle rather than genuinely explanatory.
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Incompatibility (in this context)(referring to logical relationships between determinates)
When two things cannot both be true or exist at the same time—for example, something cannot be both completely red and completely blue all over.
Partial identity account(the specific theory being evaluated in the statement)
Armstrong's theory that determinates are partially identical to (or partially the same as) their determinable—they share some features but aren't completely the same thing.
determinable(Ontology of properties; the debate concerns whether determinables are irreducible to their determinates)
A higher-level property (e.g., color) that is realized or specified by more particular determinate properties (e.g., red, blue)
determinate(Contrasted with determinables; taken to be independently posited in the causal/ontological economy)
A maximally specific instance of a determinable property (e.g., scarlet as a determinate of red)