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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If event types are primitive universals, the inference from propositional structure to event-type structure commits a category error by projecting representational structure onto ontological kinds.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If event types are primitive universals, we need some account of how they're individuated; propositional structure provides the best criterion available.
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    • 2.The distinction between representational and ontological structure is itself controversial; mirroring may reflect genuine isomorphism rather than category error.
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    • 3.Many successful metaphysical theories posit structural analogies across domains; calling this a category error requires independent argument, not assumption.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Propositions are abstract representational entities with logical structure; events are concrete particulars in spacetime with causal powers.
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    • 2.Primitive universals possess intrinsic natures independent of how minds represent them; propositional structure is fundamentally mind-dependent.
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    • 3.Assuming event-type structure mirrors propositional structure treats ontological kinds as if they conform to epistemic conveniences of language.
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