If God's willing is necessary and not free, as strict DDS demands, then divine commands lack the deontic authority required to ground moral obligation, as Wainwright and Quinn have argued.

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Reasons For

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Reason for

1.Moral obligation requires the obligator could have acted otherwise; necessity precludes this alternative possibility.
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2.Authority to command presupposes the commander's free choice to bind others; determined willing cannot ground such authority.
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3.If God must will X, then commanding X appears arbitrary rather than genuinely authoritative—mere expression, not obligation.
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Reasons Against

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Reason against

1.Authority derives from power and rightness, not libertarian freedom; a necessary being can still authoritatively command.
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2.Mathematical and logical truths are necessary yet binding; necessity needn't undermine normativity or prescriptive force.
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3.Divine nature itself could ground deontic authority independent of God's freedom; perfection suffices to obligate creatures.
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Key Terms

DDS(as used in philosophy of religion): An abbreviation for 'Divine Desire Satisfaction'—a philosophical theory about how God's commands work and what makes them binding on us.
Deontic authority(as used in ethics and philosophy of law): The legitimate power to create duties or obligations for others; the right to tell people what they ought to do.
Free (or free will)(as used in metaphysics and ethics): The ability to make genuine choices that aren't forced or predetermined; having real alternatives you could have chosen instead.
God's willing(as used in philosophy of religion and ethics): The idea that God makes choices or decisions; in this context, whether God freely chooses to command things or is forced to by necessity.
Necessary(ontological distinction in Mulla Sadra's metaphysics): The principle, God; pure existence without essence, quality or property that undergoes change or motion
Quinn(as referenced in philosophy of religion): Philip L. Quinn, a philosopher of religion who argued that God's commands can ground moral obligations even if God's will is necessary.
Wainwright(as referenced in philosophy of religion): William J. Wainwright, a philosopher who has written about divine command theory and whether God's commands can create real moral duties for us.
ground (or to ground)(metaphysics/logic): To be the foundation or reason for something; if X grounds Y, it means X explains or justifies Y.
moral obligation(Divine command theory / moral argument for theism): An expression of God's will, command, motivation, preference, or desire.

Connections

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Divine Attributes1 linked

Authority derives from power and rightness, not libertarian freedom; a necessary...Authority to command presupposes the commander's free choice to bind others; det...Divine nature itself could ground deontic authority independent of God's freedom...If God must will X, then commanding X appears arbitrary rather than genuinely au...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 2 (1 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit