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Inverse View
It is not the case that If God's willing X makes X right, then God could will gratuitous cruelty, and it would be right — which contradicts our most secure moral intuitions.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
God's nature is necessarily good; God cannot will cruelty, so the hypothetical is metaphysically impossible and proves nothing.
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2.
Our moral intuitions are evolutionarily shaped preferences, not infallible guides to metaphysical moral facts.
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3.
This argument begs the question by assuming non-theistic moral realism rather than genuinely considering divine command theory.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Gratuitous cruelty is intrinsically wrong regardless of who wills it, so God's willing it cannot make it right.
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2.
Our deepest moral convictions (torturing children for fun is wrong) should constrain theological theories, not vice versa.
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3.
Divine command theory makes morality arbitrary unless God's will is constrained by external moral standards.
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