If goodness were wholly empirical, moral obligations would reduce to statistical or causal regularities, which lack the categorical binding force Kant and intuitionists alike recognize as constitutive of morality.
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Statistical or causal regularities(as used in philosophy of science and ethics)
Patterns that show up repeatedly in nature or human behavior (like 'people usually do X') or chains of cause-and-effect, but without any sense that you *have* to follow them.
intuitionists(Post-Moorean non-naturalist tradition in metaethics)
Metaethicists who defend the view that moral knowledge, while not empirically based, is epistemically secure in the same way as mathematical or conceptual knowledge
moral obligations
The sorts of things we can fulfill even if natural inclination is lacking, by exerting an effort of will