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Inverse View
It is not the case that If identity is sortal-relative, person-collapse does not follow from shared divine substance, neutralizing the force of P1 and P2.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Sortal-relativity applies to *persistence* and *constitution*, not to fundamental *numerical identity*—which remains absolute and framework-independent.
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2.
If persons A and B share all intrinsic properties and substance, denying their identity requires explaining what metaphysically grounds the claimed difference.
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3.
Sortal-relativity without a principled stopping point risks collapsing into anti-realism about identity itself, undermining the Christian doctrine's coherence claims.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Identity conditions vary by sortal category: 'person' and 'substance' employ different criteria, so sharing divine substance need not entail personal identity.
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2.
Numerical identity is relative to counting standards; three divine persons can be one substance without contradiction under different sortal frameworks.
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3.
Material objects exemplify sortal-relativity already (ship/wood); extending this to theology dissolves the logical force of substance-based identity arguments.
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