If knowledge of a Tarskian truth theory is sufficient to understand the language, then knowledge of what the theory says is sufficient to know all facts about the meanings of expressions in the language
(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.
semantic content(Cappelen and Lepore's literalist/minimalist framework)
Propositions determined solely by conventions of meaning, precisification, disambiguation, and reference fixing — not by pragmatic inference.
sufficient condition(Used in the context of whether intrinsic properties can define species membership)
A property whose presence guarantees membership in or applicability of a category, such that having the property entails belonging to the species or class
This claim is puzzling: why should a a theory which issues T-sentences, but makes no explicit claims about meaning or content, count as a semantic theory? Davidson’s answer was that knowledge of such a theory would be sufficient to understand the language. If Davidson were right about this, then he would have a plausible argument that a semantic theory could take this form. After all, it is plausible that someone who understands a language knows the meanings of the expressions in the language; s