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    If mathematical objects are mental ideas, then the number... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Psychologism cannot adequately account for the huge infinities in mathematics.

    If mathematical objects are mental ideas, then the number of mathematical objects would be bounded by the number of ideas in human minds.

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    Psychologism cannot adequately account for the huge infinities in mathematics.Standard set theories entail that there actually exist huge infinities of mathem...There are only finitely many ideas in human minds.

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    There are only finitely many ideas in human minds.82%Intuitionism only accepts the existence of mathematical objects whose ...81%Only finite mathematical objects (like numbers and sentences) exist in...81%Mental objects cannot account for infinitely many mathematical objects...80%

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    Psychologism is the view that mathematical sentences and theories are about mental objects. Probably the most common version of this view holds that numbers are something like ideas in our heads, and ordinary mathematical sentences like ‘3 is prime’ provide descriptions of these ideas. This view was popular in the late 19th Century; it was endorsed by, e.g., the early Husserl (1891), as well as the intuitionists, Brouwer (1912, 1948) and Heyting (1956). But Frege (1884, 1893–1903) provided a hos

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