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    If matter were a thing-in-itself, it would need to have a... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    If matter were a thing-in-itself, it would need to have absolutely intrinsic properties.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Things-in-themselves possess absolutely intrinsic properties.
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    • 2.Matter is not a thing-in-itself but mere appearance.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant's thing-in-itself is defined by its unknowability to us, not by possession of absolutely intrinsic properties.
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    • 2.A thing-in-itself could coherently lack intrinsic properties if 'intrinsicness' is itself a category applicable only within possible experience.
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    • 3.Therefore, being a thing-in-itself does not entail having absolutely intrinsic properties, undermining P1.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ontic structural realists (Ladyman, French) argue that physical objects have no intrinsic properties at all, only relational ones.
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    • 2.If structural realism is coherent, matter could be a fundamental constituent of reality without possessing absolutely intrinsic properties.
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    • 3.The conditional 'if matter were a thing-in-itself, it would need absolutely intrinsic properties' thus rests on a contestable metaphysical assumption.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    A thing-in-itself could coherently lack intrinsic properties if 'intrinsicness' ...If structural realism is coherent, matter could be a fundamental constituent of ...Kant's thing-in-itself is defined by its unknowability to us, not by possession ...Matter is not a thing-in-itself but mere appearance.
    +4 moreShow less
    Ontic structural realists (Ladyman, French) argue that physical objects have no ...The conditional 'if matter were a thing-in-itself, it would need absolutely intr...Therefore, being a thing-in-itself does not entail having absolutely intrinsic p...Things-in-themselves possess absolutely intrinsic properties.

    Similar

    Matter does not have absolutely intrinsic properties.80%What we call the intrinsic determinations of matter are intrinsic only...80%Things-in-themselves possess absolutely intrinsic properties.80%Kant holds that appearances are grounded in things-in-themselves which...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russellian-monism
    View source passageHide passage
    Like Leibniz, Kant can be seen as a Russellian monist. Kant endorses a version of structuralism about physics: “All that we cognize in matter are nothing but relations. What we call the intrinsic determinations of it are intrinsic only in a relative sense…” (1781/1787: A285/B341; Pereboom 1985: 413–23, 1991a,b, 2011: 100–101; Van Cleve 1988; Langton 1998; cf. Holden 2004: 236–63). In material objects we discover only extrinsic properties and relatively intrinsic properties, never any properties
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit