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    If metaphysics and natural philosophy are required to fix... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Sensory ideas are not misrepresentations of qualities in objects, but are so obscure and confused that we cannot determine their representational content from their phenomenal character alone.

    If metaphysics and natural philosophy are required to fix the representational content of color sensations, then pre-theoretical perceivers lack the concept of color altogether — a conclusion that conflicts with the observable competence of ordinary perceptual agents.

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    Key Terms

    Observable competence(of ordinary people perceiving colors)
    Demonstrated skill or ability that you can actually see or measure—like how you can tell a red object from a blue one, showing you understand color even without formal philosophical training.
    Perceptual agents(ordinary individuals with sensory abilities)
    Beings or entities that actively perceive and experience the world through their senses—basically, creatures like humans who see, hear, and feel things.
    Pre-theoretical perceivers(those who might lack philosophical concepts)
    People who perceive the world without formal training or complex theories—essentially, ordinary people using their everyday senses and natural understanding, not experts with specialized knowledge.
    Representational content(as what explains how our beliefs can mean something)
    The ability of thoughts, mental images, or beliefs to be 'about' something in the real world—like how the thought 'it's raining' represents an actual weather condition.

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    concept(Empiricist tradition)
    A mental representation formed from copies of sensory representations, assembled in accordance with general-purpose learning rules.
    metaphysics(Hartshorne's naturalistic redefinition of metaphysics)
    On Hartshorne's view, the study not of realities beyond the physical, but of features of reality that are ubiquitous or that would exist in any possible world.
    natural philosophy(As understood in the Greek scientific tradition inherited by falsafa)
    The study of natures, where natures are causes of motion or change.

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    2 topics

    Perception1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

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    Sensory ideas are not misrepresentations of qualities in objects, but are so obs...

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