If necessaryomnipotence and necessary perfect goodness are both God-properties, they must be compossible in all possible worlds, but the problem of evil gives strong reason to doubt this compossibility.
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(Disambiguation clarifying that perfect goodness in this context means moral goodness specifically, not goodness in some other sense)
Perfect moral goodness, understood as a perfection attributed to an absolutely perfect being
possible worlds(Leibniz's modal semantics, anticipating contemporary possible-worlds semantics)
Worlds that have existence in a tenuous sense; fictional worlds used to characterize the nature of possibles that are never actualized
the problem of evil(Contemporary philosophical terminology)
The family of issues raised by the question of why pain, moral wickedness, and varieties of imperfection exist if a perfectly good and all-powerful God alone created everything in the universe.