If non-existent objects genuinely exemplify properties, they must be quantified over, making them exist in any robust ontologicalsense, thereby undermining the actualist/possibilist distinction the claim relies on.
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The view that only actual things exist; non-actual possibilia are not genuine ontological commitments
non-existent objects(Meinong's object theory)
Objects that do not exist in the actual world but which, on Meinong's view, nonetheless have being and can possess properties.
possibilism(Contrasted with actualism; evaluates obligations based on what the agent could do, not what the agent will do.)
The view that an agent's obligations are determined by the best act-set possible for the agent across the relevant time span, regardless of what the agent will actually do.