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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If normative status were constitutive of causation rather than explanatory salience, causal facts would vary across legal jurisdictions—a result that reductionist metaphysicians like Menzies and Price reject.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Causation may already be framework-dependent in ways we accept: quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and psychology use different causal vocabularies.
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    • 2.Normative status could affect which causal descriptions are *true* or *salient* without constituting causation itself—avoiding the jurisdiction problem.
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    • 3.Legal facts are social constructions that can track objective causal patterns without making causation itself socially constructed.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Causal facts should be metaphysically objective and invariant across conceptual schemes, including legal frameworks.
      ?

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    • 2.If normative status constituted causation, identical physical events would have different causal powers in different jurisdictions.
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    • 3.Reductionist metaphysics requires causal facts to supervene on fundamental physical facts, not institutional conventions.
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