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    If 'ought' were always indexed to contingent ends, moral ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Indexing 'ought' to different ends fails as an analysis of moral obligation

    If 'ought' were always indexed to contingent ends, moral discourse would be reducible to instrumental rationality, yet Moore's open question argument shows 'good' resists such naturalistic reduction.

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    Key Terms

    G.E. Moore(as the creator of the Open Question Argument)
    A highly influential British philosopher (1873-1958) who developed important ideas about how we know things and what words actually mean.
    Indexed to(as used in ethics)
    Connected or adjusted according to something else; in this case, obligations that change based on how much risk someone is creating.
    Moore's open question argument(metaethics, objection to moral naturalism)
    An argument that for any proposed natural property N, it remains an 'open question' whether something that is N is also good, thereby purporting to show that moral properties cannot be identified with natural properties
    Reducible to(as used in philosophy generally)
    Able to be broken down into or explained using simpler parts; when something complicated can be shown to just be made of something simpler.

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    contingent ends(in ethics)
    Goals or purposes that could be different depending on circumstances or what a person happens to want, rather than being fixed or universal.
    instrumental rationality(Stanovich and Stanovich 2010)
    Optimizing goal fulfillment.
    naturalistic reduction(in metaphysics and ethics)
    The attempt to explain something (like morality) purely in terms of natural, observable facts, without needing anything special or non-physical.
    ought(Deontic logic and normative theory)
    A strict (all-or-nothing) deontic modal, treated as a propositional operator

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    2 topics

    Philosophy of Language1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

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    Indexing 'ought' to different ends fails as an analysis of moral obligation

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