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    If Pascal's claim that 'reason can decide nothing here' i... — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    If Pascal's claim that 'reason can decide nothing here' is interpreted as a decision under uncertainty (no probability assigned), then the argument is apparently valid

    Natural Theology
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A decision under uncertainty assumes no probability is assigned to outcomes
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    • 2.Pascal's statement that reason can decide nothing may imply a decision under uncertainty framework
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Decision theory under strict uncertainty still requires that outcomes be commensurable, which Pascal's infinite utilities preclude.
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    • 2.Maximax and maximin rules for uncertainty yield conflicting prescriptions when infinite values appear in multiple columns of the decision matrix.
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    • 3.Ian Hacking's 'many gods' objection shows that uncertainty frameworks generate contradictory dominant strategies, undermining the argument's validity claim.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ellsberg's work on ambiguity aversion demonstrates that rational agents systematically resist maximization under complete uncertainty, not merely under risk.
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    • 2.If 'reason can decide nothing' entails genuine epistemic paralysis, no decision rule—including dominance reasoning—can be legitimately applied to the wager.
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    Topics

    Natural Theology

    Related

    A decision under uncertainty assumes no probability is assigned to outcomesDecision theory under strict uncertainty still requires that outcomes be commens...Ellsberg's work on ambiguity aversion demonstrates that rational agents systemat...Ian Hacking's 'many gods' objection shows that uncertainty frameworks generate c...
    +3 moreShow less
    If 'reason can decide nothing' entails genuine epistemic paralysis, no decision ...Maximax and maximin rules for uncertainty yield conflicting prescriptions when i...Pascal's statement that reason can decide nothing may imply a decision under unc...

    Similar

    Pascal's statement that reason can decide nothing may imply a decision...92%But by Pascal's own account, the actual ground is that 'reason can dec...88%The argument can be read as assuming no probability is assigned to God...87%Pascal's Wager assumes reason cannot decide between theistic and non-t...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: pascal-wager
    View source passageHide passage
    Without any assumption about your probability assignment to God’s existence, the argument is invalid. Rationality does not require you to wager for God if you assign probability 0 to God existing, as a strict atheist might. And Pascal does not explicitly rule this possibility out until a later passage, when he assumes that you assign positive probability to God’s existence; yet this argument is presented as if it is self-contained. His claim that “[r]eason can decide nothing here” may suggest th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit