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Inverse View
It is not the case that If phenomenal properties are not exhausted by their causal-functional roles, then functionalism—which identifies mental states solely by such roles—is false.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The argument conflates epistemic inaccessibility (we can't fully describe phenomenal properties) with metaphysical irreducibility to function.
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2.
Functionalism need not claim phenomenal properties are *exhausted by* roles—only that mental states are *constituted by* causal roles.
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3.
Zombie conceivability reflects limitations in our imagination, not genuine metaphysical possibility or refutation of functionalism.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Qualia like redness have intrinsic properties beyond their functional role in information processing.
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2.
The conceivability of zombies—beings functionally identical to humans but lacking consciousness—suggests consciousness transcends function.
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3.
Inverted spectrum scenarios show two functionally identical systems could have phenomenologically different experiences.
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