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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If physical-causal grounding suffices for determinate content, Davidson's triangulation argument establishes intersubjectivity as contingent, not transcendentally necessary.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Davidson's triangulation argument assumes content requires external causal relata; this begs the question against internalists about meaning.
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    • 2.Even if physical-causal grounding suffices, the *intelligibility* of content to multiple minds may require transcendental intersubjective structure.
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    • 3.Distinguishing contingent causal instantiation from transcendental conditions conflates metaphysical grounding with epistemic accessibility.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Davidson's triangulation requires causal relations between organism, world, and interpreter to fix content determinately.
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    • 2.If physical-causal properties suffice for content determination, then intersubjectivity depends on contingent causal facts, not necessity.
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    • 3.Possible worlds with identical physical-causal structures but no shared interpreters show intersubjectivity isn't transcendentally required.
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