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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If physicalism can be true despite the explanatory gap being unbridgeable apriori, then apriori entailment is not a necessary condition for metaphysical reduction.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If physicalism is true, the relationship between consciousness and physical states should be intelligible in principle, even if difficult in practice.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.An unbridgeable a priori gap suggests consciousness possesses intrinsic properties that no amount of physical information could explain, undercutting reduction.
      ?

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    • 3.Successful reductions in science (chemistry to physics) permit a priori understanding once the reduction base is fully specified; consciousness lacks this.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Metaphysical reduction requires only that mental properties supervene on physical properties, not that this relationship be conceptually transparent.
      ?

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    • 2.Many successful scientific reductions (e.g., water to H2O) were not a priori entailed before empirical discovery, yet count as genuine reductions.
      ?

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    • 3.The explanatory gap reflects limitations of human cognition, not metaphysical facts about whether consciousness is physically constituted.
      ?

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