If possibilism's ontology is world-invariant by design, then the conceptual room the supporting arguments claim for contingent possibilia is already closed off by the possibilist's own semantic commitments.

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Contingent possibilia(the types of non-existent things that possibilism tries to make room for): Things that could possibly exist but don't have to exist—like unrealized possibilities or things that could have been different.
Ontology(Carnap argues this enterprise is based on a mistake): The philosophical discipline that tries to answer hard questions about what there really is.
Semantic commitments(as used in philosophy of language): The underlying beliefs or meanings someone is responsible for when they make a statement, even if the words are identical to someone else's statement.
World-invariant(describing whether possibilism's claims hold true in every possible world): Something that stays the same across all possible scenarios or contexts, rather than changing from one situation to another.

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