If possible worlds themselves are necessary existents (as Lewis and Plantinga both hold for their respective frameworks), possibilism inherits necessitarian truthmakers without requiring necessitism about individuals.
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necessitarianism(A position Leibniz explicitly rejects in his mature philosophy)
The view that every truth is necessarily true, i.e., demonstrable in a finite number of steps from the containment of predicates in subjects
necessitism(Philosophy of modality; a logical truth of SQML)
The view that everything that exists exists necessarily — both possibilia and actually existing things alike are necessary beings, such that there are no worlds from which they are altogether absent.
possibilism(Contrasted with actualism; evaluates obligations based on what the agent could do, not what the agent will do.)
The view that an agent's obligations are determined by the best act-set possible for the agent across the relevant time span, regardless of what the agent will actually do.
possible worlds(Leibniz's modal semantics, anticipating contemporary possible-worlds semantics)
Worlds that have existence in a tenuous sense; fictional worlds used to characterize the nature of possibles that are never actualized
truthmakers(as used in metaphysics and logic)
In philosophy, a truthmaker is the thing in the world that makes a statement true. For example, the existence of snow is what makes the statement 'snow is white' true.