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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If practical reason constitutively involves the capacity to act on principles one endorses as rational, then motivation and reason are not cleanly separable as Hume assumes.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Endorsing a principle as rational (cognitive) and being motivated to follow it (affective) remain distinct even if typically coordinated.
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    • 2.Akrasia—acting against endorsed principles—shows motivation and rational judgment can separate, challenging the constitutive link claimed.
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    • 3.Hume can accommodate that reasons matter to action without abandoning separability: reasons inform desires without being desires themselves.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Endorsing a principle as rational necessarily involves recognizing it as binding on one's will, which is itself a form of motivation.
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    • 2.Acting on endorsed rational principles requires their motivational force; a reason recognized but unmotivating fails to guide action.
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    • 3.Hume's sharp fact/value distinction cannot account for how rational agency constitutively engages both cognition and practical commitment.
      ?

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