If primitive resemblance among concrete particulars is itself no more mysterious than the primitive instantiation relation Platonists must posit, the Platonist explanation offers no genuine explanatory gain.

?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

Concrete particulars(what the theory says makes up reality): Individual, specific things that actually exist in the real world right now—like your red shirt or this specific cup of coffee (not the general idea of 'redness' or 'cups').
Explanatory gain(as used in epistemology and logic): Actually helping us understand something better—if something doesn't explain anything or make things clearer, it has no explanatory gain.
Platonism / Platonist(as used in metaphysics and ontology): A philosophical view that abstract, non-physical things (like perfect ideas or mathematical objects) are the most real, and physical things we see are just imperfect copies of them.
instantiation relation(metaphysics/philosophy of properties): The relationship between a thing and its qualities—like how a red ball 'instantiates' or 'has' the property of being red.

Based on where you are in your exploration