If probability relations are subjective or conventional rather than real logical facts, acquaintance with them yields no objective epistemic foundation but merely privileged access to one's own credences.
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Russell's form of demonstrative identification, in which a subject is directly presented with an object (typically sense data) rather than an extra-mental individual
conventional(social ontology)
In ordinary usage, 'conventional' may mean merely that a phenomenon is social, or that something about it is arbitrary or a matter of choice. In social ontology, however, 'conventional' is understood more precisely, following variants of David Lewis's 1969 analysis or analyses that challenge Lewis's approach.
credences(Bayesian probability)
Degrees of belief held by an agent, identified in the Dutch Book argument with the agent's betting prices
objective(1910, §10)
An ideal object, something like a state of affairs or proposition, which can be expressed by an independent sentence (e.g., 'Red is a color') when judged or assumed, or by a 'that'-clause or nominal phrase when judged about.
privileged access(Used to ground the claim that Garrison can know a priori that he thinks Donald is clueless.)
The epistemic principle by which a thinker can know a priori the contents of their own thoughts.