If proper names carried sense in the way common nouns do, substituting 'Aristotle' for 'the pupil of Plato' should preserve truth-value in all contexts, yet it demonstrably does not.
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Swapping out one term or value for another in a logical statement while keeping the same structure.
common nouns(Kotarbiński's account within reism)
General names, according to traditional logic.
proper names(as the type of words Frege's theory addresses)
Words that refer to specific individual things, like 'Socrates' or 'Paris'—as opposed to general words like 'man' or 'city' that could apply to many things.
truth-value(logic and philosophy of language)
Whether a statement is true or false. Two statements can have different truth-values if one is true and the other is false.