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Inverse View
It is not the case that If qualia are real but not reducible to physical properties, then the identity theory fails to explain a genuine feature of mind.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The apparent irreducibility of qualia may reflect epistemic limits in our current theories, not genuine metaphysical non-reducibility.
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2.
Identity theory can succeed by showing qualia are higher-order properties of physical systems, not additional non-physical facts.
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3.
The claim that qualia are 'real but non-reducible' assumes what needs proof rather than establishing irreducibility independently.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Qualia have intrinsic, first-person subjective character that differs fundamentally from third-person physical descriptions.
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2.
Identity theory requires that mental states are literally identical to brain states, leaving no explanatory gap for consciousness.
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3.
If something is real but non-physical, any theory claiming mental phenomena reduce to pure physicality must be incomplete.
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