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    If qualia do not supervene on representational properties... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Representationalism is false

    If qualia do not supervene on representational properties, then representationalism is false

    Consciousness & MindPerception
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    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

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    If the inverted spectrum hypothesis is correct, then qualia do not supervene on ...Representationalism is falseThe inverted spectrum scenario is possible: Invert and Nonvert have the same rep...

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    Under representationalism, qualia-statements are equivalent to stateme...86%If the inverted spectrum hypothesis is correct, then qualia do not sup...86%Representationalism implies that if two experiences differ in qualia, ...82%Individual qualia need not be functional in nature even if having some...79%

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    Assume that this scenario is possible (for an argument that it isn’t, see Sundström 2002 and Gibbons 2005; for a reply see Littlejohn 2009). The three features just mentioned are intended to support the view that this scenario is one in which, when Invert and Nonvert both look at the fruits depicted in figure 6, their experiences have the same representational properties. In particular (glossing over a complication to be discussed in subsection 3.3 below), the banana looks yellow to both Invert

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