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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If rational agency requires only the capacity to act on second-order volitions rather than the absence of external determination, negative freedom is neither necessary nor sufficient for practical rationality.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Second-order volitions themselves require explanatory grounding; if determined externally, their endorsement is illusory, not genuinely rational.
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    • 2.Practical rationality requires the ability to have done otherwise when deliberating; pure responsiveness to reasons without alternative possibilities is insufficient.
      ?

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    • 3.A fully determined agent cannot generate new reasons or revise their evaluative framework, limiting the reflective capacity rationality demands.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Frankfurt's hierarchical model shows agents can be rational by endorsing their desires through reflection, regardless of external causal history.
      ?

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    • 2.A compatibilist agent acting on reasoned second-order volitions exhibits the control necessary for practical rationality without requiring libertarian freedom.
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    • 3.External determination doesn't undermine rationality if the agent's deliberative capacities remain intact and responsive to reasons.
      ?

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