If reference-level propositions just are facts, then Frege's distinction between a thought's being true and its merely having a truth-value collapses, undermining the very notion of propositional content.

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Frege(as a major historical figure in philosophy): Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) was a German logician and philosopher who founded modern logic and did groundbreaking work on how language relates to meaning and existence.
Reference-level propositions(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of mind): Statements that point to or describe things existing at a basic level of reality, as opposed to derived or interpreted levels.
facts(Used as relata in form (1) of the correspondence theory): States of affairs that obtain; unlike states of affairs in general, facts cannot serve as meanings of false sentences without absurd consequences
proposition(Used in the context of a semantic theory sensitive to differences in subject matter.): The content expressed by a sentence, individuated at least in part by the subject matter of the sentence and the contents of its subsentential expressions.

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