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Inverse View
It is not the case that If referential basicness is itself theory-dependent, the asymmetry Strawson posits between material particulars and theoretical entities collapses.
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Reasons For
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1.
Theory-dependence of *identification* differs from theory-dependence of *existence*; objects can be theory-dependent for access but not ontologically.
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2.
Material particulars exhibit stable phenomenal directness and causal accessibility independent of theoretical elaboration in everyday practice.
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3.
Collapsing the asymmetry conflates epistemic limits with metaphysical parity, treating framework-relativity as evidence of equal ontological status.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Theory-dependence pervades all ontological classification, including how we individuate and identify material particulars through conceptual schemes.
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2.
If material objects depend on theoretical frameworks (e.g., persistence conditions, spatiotemporal criteria), denying this for electrons is question-begging.
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3.
Strawson's asymmetry assumes theory-independent access to particulars, but this access itself requires interpretive frameworks, undermining the distinction.
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