Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If rule-application always involves such discretion, Derrida's 'just' decision cannot be distinguished structurally from what he dismisses as merely 'right'.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Derrida's 'just' decision requires confronting aporia and singularity, while 'merely right' application relies on pre-given rules—these involve structurally different orientations.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The presence of discretion everywhere doesn't entail the collapse of distinctions; discretion itself can be exercised responsibly or irresponsibly, justly or unjustly.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Derrida emphasizes ethical responsibility and violence in decision-making; this normative dimension distinguishes 'just' from 'right' even if both involve discretion.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Discretion in rule-application is logically unavoidable: rules require interpretation, and interpretation requires judgment beyond the rule itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If both 'just' decisions and 'right' applications involve irreducible discretion, the distinction between them collapses into a difference of rhetoric, not structure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Derrida's own account of undecidability suggests that all determinate decisions rest on abyssal grounds, making structural differentiation impossible.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.