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Inverse View
It is not the case that If seemings are functionally individuated by their inferential role and behavioral dispositions, no principled distinction from belief-states remains.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Seemings have distinctive phenomenal character that outstrips their functional/inferential properties.
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2.
A perceptual seeming can have identical inferential role as a belief yet differ in epistemic justificatory force.
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3.
Functional properties alone cannot capture seemings' direct presentational character or non-doxastic immediacy.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Functional individuation is the standard criterion for distinguishing mental states across philosophy of mind.
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2.
Inferential role and behavioral dispositions are exhaustive of functional properties that distinguish beliefs.
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3.
If two states are identical in all functional properties, positing additional intrinsic differences lacks explanatory power.
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