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It is not the case that If sentiments merely describe what agents feel rather than what they ought to do, sentiment-based accounts conflate moral psychology with moral epistemology.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Describing what agents feel *can* constitute epistemology if sentiments reliably track moral facts through evolved or trained responses.
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2.
The distinction between 'what we feel' and 'what we ought to do' may itself be false—sentiments can be both descriptive and normative.
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3.
Many successful epistemic systems (perception, intuition) blur psychology and justification without logical incoherence.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Moral epistemology requires normative standards for evaluating beliefs; psychology merely describes mental states without such standards.
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2.
If sentiments only describe what agents feel, they cannot justify why those feelings generate moral obligations for others.
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3.
Conflating psychology with epistemology obscures the explanatory gap between experiencing an emotion and recognizing a moral truth.
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