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    If some necessary truths are grounded in metaphysical ide... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Necessary truths and contingent truths can be distinguished while maintaining that all truths are analytic.

    If some necessary truths are grounded in metaphysical identity rather than conceptual containment, then the finite-demonstration criterion for necessity fails to capture the correct extension of necessary truths.

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    Key Terms

    conceptual containment(as used in epistemology and logic)
    The idea that one concept includes another within its definition—like 'bachelor' conceptually contains 'unmarried' because that's built into what the word means.
    extension(Semantics and philosophy of language)
    Another term for reference, i.e., the object or set of objects a term picks out
    finite-demonstration criterion(as used in logic and philosophy of mathematics)
    A rule claiming that if you can prove something is true using a limited number of logical steps, then it counts as a necessary truth.
    grounded in(whether distinctness or identity is explained by intrinsic features)
    To be explained by or to have its reason or basis in something else—like how a tree being wet is grounded in (explained by) recent rain.

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    metaphysical identity(as used in metaphysics)
    When something is necessarily the same as or part of something else because of what it fundamentally is, not just because we define it that way.
    necessary truths(Leibniz's argument for God's existence from eternal truths)
    Truths that hold independently of whether any finite minds exist to think them

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

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    Necessary truths and contingent truths can be distinguished while maintaining th...

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