If space were the primary substance for Descartes, the vacuum would be metaphysically possible, yet he argues its impossibility precisely because extension cannot exist without corporeal substance (Pr II 16-18).
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Something that could exist or happen in reality without violating the fundamental laws of nature — not logically contradictory.
primary substance(Aristotelian ontology)
The conventional English rendering of Aristotle's 'protê ousia', meaning more literally 'primary being'; the core instance of being upon which all other categories of being depend
vacuum(Absolutist notion endorsed by Patrizi and Gassendi, rejected by Descartes)
A space totally devoid of matter; an empty space not filled by any material substance.