If the causal sufficiency of physical antecedents already explains bodily movement, then reasons are explanatorily redundant with respect to behavior but not with respect to action under intentional description.

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Action under intentional description(in philosophy of action): A bodily movement described in terms of what you meant to do or why you did it (like 'I raised my arm to vote' rather than just 'my arm moved up').
Physical antecedents(in philosophy of mind and action): The physical events or conditions that come before something happens, like the brain states and bodily conditions that exist right before you move your arm.
behavior(Contrasted with mere interaction with a bare environment; behavior is mediated by how the agent conceptualizes their situation.): Endogenously produced movement, i.e., movement whose causal origin is within the person who represents their situation in a certain way.
causal sufficiency(Causal modeling and directed acyclic graphs (DAGs)): A set of variables V is causally sufficient if there is no variable W omitted from V such that, if added to V, it would be a direct cause of two variables already in V.

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