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    If the difference between an agent making one decision ra... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Challenges→An agent cannot be morally responsible for a decision if the difference between making that decision and making an alternative decision is merely a matter of luck.

    If the difference between an agent making one decision rather than another is merely a matter of luck, the agent cannot be responsible for the decision made.

    Modality & PossibilityMoral Responsibility
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    Accounts of this sort are often thought to be vulnerable to the problem of luck. There are a various formulations of the problem of luck. (Versions of it are advanced by Almeida and Bernstein [2003], Ekstrom [2000: 105], Haji [1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, and 2001], Levy [2011: ch. 3], and Strawson [1994]. Mele [1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2005, and 2006: chs 1 and 5] discusses the argument but rejects its conclusion.) Here is one version: suppose an agent decides to steal. If there was a chance,

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