If the intellect's ontological status as 'likeness of beings' derives from its receptive structure rather than its acts, Dietrich conflates the capacity for knowing with the privation of being.
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(describing how knowledge works according to this philosophical tradition)
The idea that the mind becomes similar to or mirrors the things it knows about.
Ontological status(in metaphysics (the study of what exists))
What kind of thing something is considered to be or how real it exists—for example, whether something is a physical object, a concept, a property, or something else entirely.
Privation of being(a technical concept meaning something is not fully real or is missing something essential)
The absence or lack of actual existence or fullness—being incomplete or not-yet-actual.
Receptive structure(describing how the intellect might work as a passive receiver rather than active thinker)
The capacity to receive or take in information, like how a mirror receives light to reflect an image.