Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If the neo-Humean motivational psychology embedded in P3 is false, the inference from MJI to non-cognitive expressivism loses its essential bridge premise.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The MJI-to-expressivism inference may rely on other premises (like the Frege-Geach problem) that remain independent of whether P3's specific psychology holds.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Alternative non-cognitivisms (quasi-realism, projectivism) can survive even if P3 fails, suggesting the argument has multiple possible bridges, not one essential one.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Rejecting P3 might force a retrenchment rather than collapse of expressivism, undermining claims about 'essential' rather than merely 'important' bridge premises.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.P3's neo-Humean framework assumes desires are prior to and independent of moral judgments, which is logically necessary for the MJI-to-expressivism inference.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If moral judgments can themselves constitute or rationally determine desires, then motivational internalism no longer requires non-cognitivism to explain moral motivation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Cognitivists about moral properties can preserve internalism via rational motivation, making P3's psychological premise the load-bearing element of the expressivist argument.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42