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    If the paradox of analysis cannot be stably formulated wi... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Identity of intension (L-equivalence) is insufficient as a criterion of synonymy for resolving the paradox of analysis

    If the paradox of analysis cannot be stably formulated without circular appeal to synonymy, the demand for a criterion stronger than L-equivalence targets a pseudo-problem.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Any formulation of the paradox that avoids circularity must already presuppose the distinction it aims to explain, making it self-defeating.
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    • 2.L-equivalence is sufficient for meaningful analysis because it captures all logically relevant content between analysans and analysandum.
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    • 3.Demanding criteria beyond L-equivalence commits us to metaphysical properties (like 'real synonymy') that lack independent justification.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.The paradox can be formulated without synonymy: 'How can identical truths differ in cognitive significance?' This is empirically sound.
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    • 2.L-equivalence fails to distinguish analytic truths from a posteriori identities (like 'water=H2O'), yet analysis demands this distinction.
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    • 3.Calling a problem 'pseudo' merely because its solution is difficult abandons rather than resolves legitimate philosophical confusion.
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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Any formulation of the paradox that avoids circularity must already presuppose t...Calling a problem 'pseudo' merely because its solution is difficult abandons rat...Demanding criteria beyond L-equivalence commits us to metaphysical properties (l...Identity of intension (L-equivalence) is insufficient as a criterion of synonymy...
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    L-equivalence fails to distinguish analytic truths from a posteriori identities ...L-equivalence is sufficient for meaningful analysis because it captures all logi...The paradox can be formulated without synonymy: 'How can identical truths differ...

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