If the proper subset relation between causal relations of generic and specific types is preserved at the level of tokens, then tokens of generic types differ causally from tokens of specific types
When one group is completely contained within another group, but they're not the same group. For example, all dogs are a proper subset of all animals, because every dog is an animal, but not every animal is a dog.
Specific types(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of language)
More narrow categories within a larger group. For example, 'chair' is a specific type within the generic type 'furniture.'
causal relations(Davidson's distinction between causal and logical relations)
Relations that obtain between events themselves, independent of how those events are described
tokens(Curry's formal systems terminology)
Curry's term for the primitives of his formal systems, noted as misleading by the author
A subset-of-causal-relations account of generic/determinable universals promisingly accommodates many features of determination, for reasons similar to those attaching to powers-based accounts, below. It also ensures the metaphysical irreducibility of a generic/determinable type to any specific/determinate type, by the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (if \(G\) has only a proper subset of causal relations of \(S\), \(G\) cannot be identified with \(S\)); and if this proper subset