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    If the will were moved by an external principle as agent,... — Carmelics
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    Supports→God alone is able to move the creaturely will as agent without violence (i.e., consistently with its voluntary nature).

    If the will were moved by an external principle as agent, the movement would be violent.

    Divine Attributes
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    Divine Attributes

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    God alone is able to move the creaturely will as agent without violence (i.e., c...God alone is the cause and sustainer of the will's being, and thus is able to mo...

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    God alone is the cause and sustainer of the will's being, and thus is ...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
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    AI-extracted
    SEP: providence-divine
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    It may seem obvious that neither can survive: that once the operations of creaturely wills are subordinated to God’s will, libertarian freedom disappears, and with it any hope of absolving God of moral evil. But at least where freedom is concerned, traditional theology asserts the opposite. Augustine, for example, held that God moves our wills, working in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure, as scripture says (Phil. 2:13). Yet he insists that this does not diminish our freedom, for if it did we would not be told in the same passage to work out our salvation in fear and trembling (On...

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