If the Zebra* case relies on subjective indistinguishability as the operative condition for justification failure, it presupposes an internalist conception of justification that disjunctivism explicitly rejects, undermining the claim that it instantiates the disjunctive template.

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Internalism (internalist conception of justification)(epistemology): The idea that what makes your belief justified depends only on things inside your own mind—your thoughts, experiences, and reasoning—not on how the outside world actually is.
Presupposes(as describing what Plantinga's argument takes for granted): Assumes something to be true without proving it—like how an argument might presuppose that logic works, without first arguing that logic is valid.
Subjective indistinguishability(epistemology): When two situations feel identical from your personal perspective—you can't tell them apart based on your own experience alone.
Zebra case(epistemology (theory of knowledge)): A famous thought experiment in philosophy where you're asked whether you can really know you're looking at a zebra versus a cleverly painted mule—used to explore what conditions are needed for genuine knowledge.

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