If token physicalism were a necessary condition, then a world with physical tokens bearing irreducibly non-physical phenomenal properties would count as physicalist, which contradicts the standard supervenience-based formulations of Hellman and Thompson.
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physicalism(The target position that the knowledge argument is designed to refute)
The thesis that physical theory can in principle account for everything there is to know about the world
supervenience(Philosophy of mind and reduction; contrasted with full reduction)
A relation in which mental (or higher-level) states are dependent on physiological (or lower-level) states such that any two cases with identical lower-level bases are identical in their higher-level states; a necessary but not sufficient condition for reduction.
token physicalism(Used here as condition (3) in a broader analysis of physicalism)
The thesis that if physicalism is true, every object or particular must be identical with some physical object or particular.