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    If two things differ in some possible world, they cannot ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Personal Identity
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    Supports→O and S cannot be the same ship

    If two things differ in some possible world, they cannot be identical

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

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    O and S cannot be the same shipThere is a possible world in which O and S differ

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    If two things differ with respect to existence across possible worlds,...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
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    If two things have different properties, they are not identical86%
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    SEP: identity-relative
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    As indicated, Kripke denies that his argument (for the necessity of origin) applies to the case of change over time: “The question whether the table could have changed into ice is irrelevant here” (1972, 1980). So the question whether \(O\) could change into \(S\) is supposedly “irrelevant.” But Kripke does not give a reason for this claim, and if cases of trans-temporal identity and trans-world identity differ markedly in relevant respects — respects relevant to Kripke’s argument for the necess

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