If type identity is world-relative rather than necessary across all possible worlds, the counterexamples from social or institutional properties dissolve without abandoning type physicalism.
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Worlds that have existence in a tenuous sense; fictional worlds used to characterize the nature of possibles that are never actualized
type identity(Contrasted with token-token identity in the passage)
A relation holding between mental kinds and neurophysiological kinds when every instance of a given mental state type corresponds to the same neurophysiological state type across all beings
type physicalism(Distinguished from supervenience physicalism; used to assess sufficient vs. necessary conditions for physicalism)
The view that every property is identical with some physical property