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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If zero probabilities are never epistemically legitimate assignments in a well-formed credence function, the claimed discrete/continuous asymmetry rests on an artifact of an inadequate probability framework rather than a genuine conceptual difference.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Regularity conditions create severe technical problems: they're incompatible with conditioning on measure-zero events, essential for continuous probability theory.
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    • 2.Some asymmetries between discrete and continuous cases reflect genuine structural differences (countable vs uncountable additivity), not merely framework artifacts.
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    • 3.Declaring standard probability theory 'inadequate' simply to preserve a philosophical thesis inverts the proper direction of theory justification.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Standard probability frameworks assign zero probability to measure-zero sets arbitrarily, conflating metaphysical impossibility with mathematical convenience.
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    • 2.Regularity conditions (no zero probabilities for contingent propositions) are theoretically coherent and capture intuitions about epistemic openness better than standard frameworks.
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    • 3.If the discrete/continuous distinction vanishes under regularity conditions, the asymmetry reflects framework limitations rather than objective metaphysical structure.
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